Abstract. This essay considers the extent to which a concept of emergence can be associated with Effective Field Theories (EFTs). I suggest that such a concept can be characterized by microphysicalism and novelty underwritten by the elimination of degrees of freedom from a high-energy theory, and argue that this makes emergence in EFTs distinct from other concepts of emergence in physics that have appeared in the recent philosophical literature. Word count: 5052.
Introduction
An effective field theory (EFT) of a physical system is a description of the system at energies low, or distances large, compared to a cutoff. EFTs are constructed via a process in which degrees of freedom are eliminated from a high-energy/short-distance theory. Formulating a concept of emergence for EFTs is important for at least two reasons. First, EFTs play essential roles in contemporary physics: many authors believe the Standard Model is an EFT, and most condensed matter systems can be described by EFTs. Second, physical systems that can be described by EFTs have been associated with various concepts of emergence in the recent philosophical literature: Mainwood (2006) suggests that the "new emergentism" of condensed matter physicists (e.g., Anderson 1972, Laughlin and Pine 2000) is characterized by microphysicalism and novelty underwritten by the physical mechanisms of spontaneous symmetry breaking and universality. Morrison (2012) similarly stresses the role of spontaneous symmetry breaking as essential to a concept of emergence, while Batterman (2011) focuses on universality. Moreover, Wilson (2010) claims a concept of emergence can be based on the elimination of degrees of freedom. I will suggest that while a concept of emergence appropriate for EFTs shares aspects of these views, it is distinct from them. In the following, Section 2 reviews the steps involved in the construction of an EFT, Section 3 offers an interpretation of EFTs from which Section 4 extracts a concept of emergence based on microphysicalism and novelty. Finally, Section 5 compares this concept with those of the authors mentioned above.
EFTs and the Elimination of Degrees of Freedom
The concept of emergence I wish to associate with EFTs is based on the elimination of degrees of freedom from a theory in physics. A degree of freedom associated with a theory is a parameter that needs to be assigned a value in order to provide a dynamical state description of a physical system described by the theory. A dynamical state description is a description of the system at an instant in time that, in conjunction with an equation of motion, determines a future or a past state. Thus, for example, a dynamical state description of a free classical field φ(x) governed by a second-order partial differential equation of motion is specified by the values that φ(x) and its first derivative take at every point of spacetime.
For some theories, degrees of freedom encoding high energies (or short distances) can be eliminated in such a way that the result is an effective theory that produces the same predictions as the original when restricted to low energies (large distances). One advantage of an effective theory is that it makes calculations more tractable. Moreover, many quantum field theories (QFTs) can only be solved via perturbative expansions which contain divergent integrals at high energies. For these theories, the construction of an EFT provides not just a way of avoiding divergences, but a means of interpreting QFTs as well. This construction proceeds in two steps:
(I) The high-energy degrees of freedom are identified and integrated out of the Lagrangian density representing the theory.
This assumes that the theory is encoded in a Lagrangian density L[φ], which is a functional of a field variable φ(x). 1 To eliminate high-energy degrees of freedom, one chooses an energy cutoff Λ and then decomposes φ(x) into high-and low-energy parts,
and φ L (x) are associated with momenta greater than and less than Λ, respectively. The field variable φ H (x) is then integrated out of the corresponding generating functional,
This functional integral is taken over all possible field configurations φ H (x). This eliminates these degrees of freedom from the Lagrangian density by replacing them with appropriate configurations of the remaining degrees of freedom. The result is an effective Lagrangian density
Typically, the functional integral over φ H (x) in (1) has no exact solution, and even when it does, it may produce an effective Langrangian density that contains non-local terms that depend on more than one spacetime point. This is addressed by a second step:
(II) The effective Lagrangian density is expanded in a local operator expansion
where L 0 is the free Lagrangian density (for weak interactions), the c i are coupling constants, and the sum is over all local operators O i allowed by the symmetries of L.
Steps (I) and (II) can be characterized in the following ways:
(i) The effective Lagrangian density is formally distinct from the high-energy Lagrangian density. To the extent that this entails that the Euler-Lagrange equations of motion of the effective theory are distinct from those of the high-energy theory, the low-energy degrees of freedom φ L (x) are dynamically distinct from the original degrees of freedom φ(x).
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(ii) Second, while the local operator expansion (2) can be viewed formally as an approximate solution to the path integral (1), one can argue that an effective Lagrangian density is not simply an approximation of a high-energy Lagrangian density. In many cases, the exact form of the high-energy Lagrangian density is unknown, but an effective Langrangian density can still be constructed. Such a "bottom-up" EFT is obtained by including in (2) all terms consistent with the symmetries and interactions assumed to be relevant at the energy scale of interest. A "folk theorem" identified by Weinberg (1979, 329) then justifies viewing such bottom-up EFTs as not simply approximations to a high-energy theory. 3 This suggests that, even in the context of a "top-down" EFT for which a high-energy theory is known, the local operator expansion conceptually stands on its own.
An Interpretation of EFTs
Nothing in the construction of a bottom-up EFT precludes us from assuming that a high-energy theory exists. A high-energy theory in this context need only be a theory that describes phenomena at an energy scale above the cutoff. Moreover, even in the top-down context, the EFT does not completely determine the form of the high-energy theory: for a given high-energy theory, more than one top-down EFT can be constructed. These considerations suggest the following interpretation of EFTs, both top-down and bottom-up:
(a) Failure of law-like deducibility. If we understand the laws of a theory encoded in a Lagrangian density to be its Euler-Lagrange equations of motion, then the phenomena described by an EFT are not deducible consequences of the laws of a high-energy theory.
(b) Ontological distinctness. Phenomena described by an EFT are ontologically distinct from phenomena described by a high-energy theory.
(c) Ontological dependence. Phenomena described by an EFT are ontologically dependent on phenomena described by a high-energy theory.
Claims (a) and (b) are suggested by the formal distinction between an effective Lagrangian density and a high-energy Lagrangian density, and their distinct Euler-Lagrange equations of motion. In the case of (b), this suggests that the degrees of freedom of an EFT are dynamically distinct from those of a high-energy theory; moreover, the former are typically encoded in field variables that are formally distinct from those that encode the latter (i.e., different field variables appear in the Lagrangian densities of an EFT and a high-energy theory). On the other hand, the fact that the degrees of freedom of the former are exactly the low-energy degrees of freedom of the latter suggests (c): the phenomena described by an EFT do not completely "float free" of the phenomena described by a high-energy theory. The following examples will further flesh out this interpretation.
Example 1. A Top-Down EFT for a 2-dimensional Quantum Hall Liquid.
The high-energy degrees of freedom of a quantum Hall liquid describe electrons moving in a 2-dimensional conductor and coupled to a magnetic field and a Chern-Simons field. This is described by a non-relativistic Lagrangian density (Schakel 2008, 349) ,
where ψ encodes electron degrees of freedom, the pair (A 0 , A i ), i = 1, 2, encodes magnetic field degrees of freedom, aµ (µ = 0, 1, 2) encodes the degrees of freedom of a Chern-Simons field, and µ is the chemical potential. The purpose of the last term is to attach an even number of magnetic fluxes to the electrons, turning them into "composite" electrons. This description entails that, in the presence of a strong external magnetic field, the conductivity σ of the system becomes quantized in units of e 2 /h; i.e., σ = ν(e 2 /h), where ν is called the "filling factor". The integer quantum Hall effect occurs for integer values of ν and the fractional quantum Hall effect occurs for values of ν given by simple fractions. Both effects are characterized by incompressibility and dissipationless transport. These properties signal a transition to a state of matter distinct from the conductor and referred to as a quantum Hall liquid.
The properties of a quantum Hall liquid can be derived from the high-energy theory (3) by integrating out the electron degrees of freedom. The remaining degrees of freedom can then be identified with two Chern-Simons fields, aµ, (Αµ + aµ), described by a "pure" Chern-Simons effective Lagrangian density (Schakel 2008, 349) ,
This is an example of a topological quantum field theory; i.e., a QFT encoded in a Lagrangian density in which a spacetime metric does not appear. Thus not only is the high-energy Lagrangian density (3) formally distinct from the effective Lagrangian density (4), it is also conceptually distinct: (3) encodes a non-relativistic QFT, whereas (4) encodes a topological QFT. This suggests that the phenomena described by the EFT are not deducible consequences of the laws of the high-energy theory, and that the EFT is dynamically distinct from the high-energy theory. Dynamical distinctness, coupled with the formal distinction between the field variables of the high-energy theory and those of the EFT, suggest that the latter characterize phenomena (i.e., topological Chern-Simons fields) that are ontologically distinct from those characterized by the former (i.e., non-relativistic composite electrons coupled to a magnetic field). Finally, the fact that the degrees of freedom of (4) are the low-energy degrees of freedom of (3) suggests that the phenomena described by (4) are ontologically dependent on those characterized by (3). In particular, a quantum Hall liquid ultimately consists of non-relativistic electrons.
Example 2. A "Bottom-Up" EFT for General Relativity.
A bottom-up EFT is constructed in the absence of a high-energy theory by identifying relevant symmetries and then constructing a local operator expansion (2) that includes all possible interactions consistent with these symmetries. In the case of general relativity, the symmetries are general covariance and local Lorentz invariance. If one assumes that the metric gµν encodes low-energy degrees of freedom of an unknown high-energy theory, then an effective Lagrangian density for general relativity can be given by,
where g = det(gµν), R, Rµν are the Ricci scalar and Ricci tensor, the c i are coupling constants, and the ellipses refer to higher-order terms (Donoghue 1995, 7) . The Euler-Lagrange equations of motion generated by the first two terms are the Einstein equations with cosmological constant λ, and one can argue that the effect of higher-order terms is beyond current tests of general relativity. In this example, since a high-energy theory is not known, the EFT is trivially characterized by the failure of law-like deducibility and ontological distinctness. Ontological dependence is secured by the assumption that the field variable gµν encodes the low-energy degrees of freedom of the unknown high-energy theory.
Emergence in EFTs
An EFT does not stand in a precise mathematical relation to a high-energy theory.
Step (I) in the construction of an EFT requires both a choice of cutoff and a choice of low-energy degrees of freedom with respect to this cutoff, and these choices typically will be dictated by context. Similarly, the local operator expansion in Step (II) requires a context-specific identification of the symmetries of the high-energy theory (when it exists) or of the phenomena under investigation. This suggests that a purely formal concept of emergence for EFTs (i.e., a concept based on a formal relation between theories) may not be appropriate. The approach adopted in this section will be to extract an ontological concept of emergence from the interpretation of EFTs suggested in Section 3. This interpretation motivates the following desiderata.
(i) The emergent system should ultimately be composed of microphysical systems that comprise the fundamental system and that obey the fundamental system's laws.
(ii) The properties of the emergent system should not be deducible from the properties of the fundamental system. I will follow Mainwood (2006, 20) in referring to these desiderata as microphysicalism and novelty, respectively. They are underwritten by the elimination of degrees of freedom in the construction of an EFT. Thus one might tell the following story about how the phenomena described by an EFT emerge from the phenomena described by a high-energy theory:
(i) First, high-energy degrees of freedom are integrated out of the high-energy theory, and this entails that the degrees of freedom of the EFT are exactly the low-energy degrees of freedom of the high-energy theory. Thus is microphysicalism secured.
(ii) Second, the result of a local operator expansion of the effective Lagrangian density is a theory that is dynamically distinct from the high-energy theory in the sense of a failure of law-like deducibility: the phenomena described by the EFT cannot be deduced from those described by the high-energy theory. Thus is novelty secured.
Other Notions of Emergence
To further flesh out the above concept of emergence in EFTs, this section compares it with other accounts in the philosophical literature.
"New Emergentism", Spontaneous Symmetry
Breaking, and Universality. Mainwood (2006, 20) characterizes the "new emergentism" of prominent condensed matter physicists (Anderson 1972, Laughlin and Pines 2000) in terms of microphysicalism and novelty, as described above, underwritten by a physical mechanism. According to Mainwood, the specification of the latter is essential to avoid trivialization: "...emergent properties are not a panacea, to be appealed to whenever we are puzzled by the properties of large systems. In each case, we must produce a detailed physical mechanism for emergence, which rigorously explains the qualitative difference that we see with the microphysical" (284). Such a mechanism plays both an explanatory and a formal role. First, it explains how novelty arises: New Emergentists "...follow a strategy of first exhibiting evidence for emergence: the novel and unexpected character of certain systemic properties, and only then presenting a physical process -a 'mechanism' -that explains how such novelty can arise" (87). Second, formally, it underwrites the elimination of degrees of freedom from a constitutive system, resulting in a system characterized by fewer degrees of freedom and exhibiting emergent phenomena. For Mainwood, the physical mechanism of most interest is spontaneous symmetry breaking (SSB): "The claim of the New Emergentists is that in the phenomenon of symmetry-breaking we have a mechanism by which the set of 'good coordinates' of the whole can be entirely different from the sets of good coordinates which apply to the constituent parts when in isolation or in other wholes" (107). However, Mainwood is careful to note that, in addition to SSB, the New Emergentists identify other mechanisms including renormalization, the integer and fractional quantum Hall effects, and localization (93), as well as universality (116).
SSB is the mechanism associated with the Landau-Ginzburg theory of phase transitions, and its extension by renormalization group (RG) techniques. These theoretical frameworks associate phases with internal orders characterized by symmetries, and phase transitions with symmetry breaking. In the RG approach, phase transitions are analyzed by observing the behavior of a theory as its parameters are rescaled with respect to a cutoff. Such rescaling generates a flow in the theory's abstract parameter space. A fixed point of such a flow is a point at which parameter values remain unchanged under further rescaling; i.e., they become scale invariant. A phase transition is characterized by such a fixed point: the properties associated with it are independent of the micro-scale properties of the system. In general, there can be many distinct RG flows that intersect a given fixed point. A fixed point thus defines a universality class consisting of all theories on RG flows that intersect it. These theories all exhibit the same scale-independent lowenergy/large distance behavior, regardless of their high-energy/microphysical details.
Both SSB and universality play essential roles in two other recent discussions of emergence. These accounts view universality as underwriting the ontological non-reductivism they deem necessary in descriptions of emergent phenomena, but differ on the significance of SSB. On the one hand, Batterman (2011 Batterman ( , 1034 has suggested that the notion of a universality class underwrites a concept of emergence "...that goes beyond mere claims to the effect that symmetry breaking occurs." According to Batterman (2011 Batterman ( , 1038 , "It seems hardly satisfactory to appeal to symmetry breaking as an organizing principle independent of microdetails when we have such a profoundly successful story about why the microdetails in fact are largely independent or irrelevant." On the other hand, Morrison (2012, 157) focuses explicitly on SSB as essential to the concept of emergence: "Although the RG provides an explanatory framework that shows why microphysical details can be ignored, it does not give us the kind of physical dynamics required for the production of emergent phenomena. For that we need symmetry breaking and the accompanying phase transitions." Morrison (2012, 147) moreover suggests that "understanding emergent phenomena in terms of symmetry breaking --a structural dynamical feature of physical systems... --clarifies both how and why emergent phenomena are independent of any specific configuration of their microphysical base." To support this claim, Morrison (2012, 153-155 ) discusses an example due to Weinberg (1986) in which the essential properties of a superconductor are derived, not from a theory of its microconstituents (i.e., Cooper pairs), but by imposing symmetry constraints directly on a Lagrangian density.
Weinberg's example is instructive insofar as it is an example of a bottom-up EFT. This raises two questions: First, how are SSB and universality related to EFTs, and second, if we agree with the above authors on the necessity of identifying a mechanism to underwrite a nontrivial concept of emergence, what is the nature of this mechanism in the EFT context?
The answer to the first question is implicit in the examples in Section 3: neither involves SSB or universality, at least as the latter is usually defined. Example 1 involves a phase transition from a conductor to a more ordered quantum Hall liquid; however, the orders cannot be distinguished by their symmetries. Wenn (1995) has developed a theory of "topological orders" that characterize the states of quantum Hall liquids, and argues that such liquids cannot be described by the Landau-Ginzburg theory of phase changes governed by SSB. 4 Moreover, while quantum Hall liquids may be described in terms of universality, assumedly it will not involve the account given by the RG analysis of fixed points. In this broader sense, SSB is sufficient, but not necessary for universality. Example 2 also is not characterized by SSB or universality. In general, while the expansion point in the local operator expansion (2) of an effective Lagrangian density is defined by a fixed point, 5 an EFT itself should not be identified with a fixed point, nor, necessarily, with a point on an RG flow that intersects a fixed point. Both of the latter correspond to renormalizable theories, whereas EFTs in general need not be renormalizable. 6 This suggests that a concept of emergence based on universality is too narrow for EFTs.
A concept of emergence for EFTs should thus be broader than one underwritten by SSB or universality. Section 4 suggested that emergence in EFTs be characterized in terms of microphysicalism and novelty, and that these characteristics are underwritten simply by the elimination of degrees of freedom in an EFT. Both Mainwood and Morrison require a 4 The ground-state degeneracy that characterizes a quantum Hall liquid is not a consequence of symmetry, but rather depends on spatial topology (Wenn 1995, 408) . 5 For weak interactions, the expansion point L 0 is given by a Gaussian fixed point (at which the coupling constants vanish), but any fixed point will do. In general, the terms in (2) are characterized by their behavior with respect to a fixed point: they either increase, decrease, or remain constant as the RG flow approaches the fixed point. 6 A fixed point corresponds to a renormalized theory; i.e., a theory that is scale-independent. A point on an RG flow that intersects a fixed point corresponds to a non-renormalized renormalizable theory; i.e., a theory that is capable of being made scale-independent, but whose parameters have not yet been rescaled to make this so. An EFT in general is a point on an RG flow that passes through a neighborhood of a fixed point, but does not intersect it.
causal/mechanical explanation of emergent phenomena in terms of a physical process like SSB (Batterman, on the other hand, is content with a unifying explanation based on RG). Morrison (2012, 160) , in particular, views an appeal to the elimination of degrees of freedom as not enough: "[t]he important issue...is not just the elimination of irrelevant degrees of freedom; rather it is the existence or emergence of cooperative behavior and the nature of the order parameter (associated with symmetry breaking) that characterizes the different kinds of systems." Admittedly, by itself, an appeal to the elimination of degrees of freedom does not explain the existence and novel nature of emergent phenomena. On the other hand, within the particular interpretive framework suggested in Section 3, the elimination of degrees of freedom in an EFT does fulfill a causal/mechanical explanatory role. In particular, the elimination of degrees of freedom in an EFT explains the existence and novel nature of low-energy emergent phenomena by explaining how they are related to high-energy phenomena by a failure of lawlike deducibility, and by ontological distinctness tempered by ontological dependence. Thus I would argue that the particular type of elimination of degrees of freedom in an EFT, coupled with an appropriate interpretation of EFTs, succeeds in doing the explanatory work deemed necessary by Mainwood and Morrison for a nontrivial concept of emergence. Wilson's (2010, 282) "weak ontological emergence" is another approach that emphasizes the elimination of degrees of freedom. Eliminating degrees of freedom, according to Wilson, involves imposing constraints that eliminate functional dependences between system properties and some subset of degrees of freedom (284). Examples of this include: (c) Quantum degrees of freedom in the classical limit (288-290).
"Weak Ontological Emergence".
Example (a) involves imposing boundary conditions on a theory's equations of motion; thus it does not apply to the EFT context which involves two formally distinct theories. Example (b) is drawn from discussions in Batterman (2002) and arises in the context of two theories (statistical mechanics and thermodynamics) related by a limiting relation. Arguably, this example also does not apply to the EFT context: the procedure involved in constructing an EFT does not produce a limiting relation between the EFT and its high-energy theory (see Bain 2012, 28-32 , for further discussion of Batterman's (2002) notion of emergence in the context of EFTs). Finally, Example (c) also arises from an assumed limiting relation between two theories (classical and quantum mechanics), and thus is not applicable to EFTs.
The elimination of degrees of freedom in an EFT is not characterized by a limiting relation between theories, nor by the imposition of constraints on a set of equations of motion. Rather, it is characterized by the imposition of constraints (in the form of an energy, or minimum length, cutoff boundary condition) directly on the degrees of freedom of a Lagrangian density, as opposed to its equations of motion. This yields a formally distinct effective Lagrangian density with a distinct set of equations of motion. This, together with the local operator expansion, severs functional dependences between the remaining low-energy degrees of freedom and the dynamics of the high-energy theory. This type of elimination of degrees of freedom does not appear to be what Wilson has in mind. Wilson takes the type of elimination of degrees of freedom that underwrites weak ontological emergence to play two roles. First, it establishes the physical acceptability of an emergent entity by securing the law-like deducibility of its behavior from its composing parts. This is taken to partially underwrite a concept of physicalism:
...so long as a given special science treats only of entities E whose characterization requires the same or fewer DOF [degrees of freedom] as their composing e i , the special science is appropriately seen as extracted from the more fundamental science treating the e i , such that the laws of the special science (expressing, in particular, the properties and behavior of E) are deducible consequences of the laws of the more fundamental science (expressing, in particular, the properties and behavior of the e i ). This is the case, in particular, with the special sciences (statistical and classical mechanics) treating entities satisfying Weak ontological emergence. (Wilson 2010, 295) Second, according to Wilson, the elimination of degrees of freedom entails that an emergent entity is characterized by different law-governed properties and behavior than those of its composing parts. This is taken to underwrite a failure of ontological reductionism:
The line of thought appeals to the laws that scientists take to govern an entity of a given type, as providing an appropriate basis for identifying the DOF associated with that entity... [The argument] concludes that [the emergent entity] E is not identical to [its composing parts] e r , on grounds that there are scientific reasons for associating E with certain laws, such that specifying E's law-governed properties and behavior requires certain DOF; and for associating e r with certain laws, such that specifying e r 's law-governed properties and behavior requires certain DOF different from those required to characterize E. (Wilson 2010, 301) This failure of ontological reductionism might charitably be associated with a notion of novelty, and this, coupled with physicalism might suggest a similarity between Wilson's weak ontological emergence and the sense of emergence in EFTs expounded in Section 4 above. However, the mechanisms that underwrite these characteristics are decidedly different: I've suggested that the elimination of degrees of freedom in an EFT is characterized by a failure of law-like deducibility, and take this to underwrite novelty. I've also suggested that elimination of degrees of freedom in an EFT is characterized by the retention, in the EFT, of the low-energy degrees of freedom of the high-energy theory, and it is this fact that underwrites a concept of (micro)physicalism. I conclude that Wilson's concept of emergence is not applicable to EFTs, under the interpretation suggested in Section 3.
Conclusion
This essay suggests that emergence in an EFT can be characterized by novelty and microphysicalism underwritten by the elimination of degrees of freedom from a high-energy theory. This is an elimination of degrees of freedom imposed directly on a high-energy Lagrangian density, as opposed to a set of equations of motion. It results in an effective Lagrangian density that can be interpreted as describing novel phenomena in the sense of being dynamically independent of, and thus not deducible from, the phenomena associated with a highenergy theory. These novel phenomena can be said to ultimately be composed of the phenomena that are constitutive of a high-energy theory, insofar as the degrees of freedom exhibited by the former are exactly the low-energy degrees of freedom exhibited by the latter. Finally it was argued in Section 5 that this concept of emergence in EFTs is more general than concepts of emergence based on spontaneous symmetry breaking and/or universality, but more narrow that a concept based simply on the elimination of degrees of freedom.
